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In December 2003, the Brazilian congress passed a law that led to a natural personal lending 
experiment. The law allows banks to offer loans with repayment through automatic payroll 
deduction, which, in effect, turns future income into collateral. We estimate the impact of the 
new law using auto loans as a control group. The law has caused a reduction in interest rates 
and an increase in the volume of personal credit.  
KEY WORDS: Credit markets, collateral, difference-in-differences. 







                                                 
§The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees, Luis Henrique Braido, Carlos Eugênio da Costa, 
Juliano Assunção, Marcio Nakane, Leonardo Rezende, Marcio Garcia, Claudio Ferraz, Rafael Coutinho, 
Daniel Gottlieb and the seminar audiences at EPGE/FGV, IPEA and the 2006 Latin American Meeting of 
the Econometric Society in Mexico City for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
† Banco Central do Brasil and Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio: christiano.coelho@bcb.gov.br.  
‡ Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio: jmpm@econ.puc-rio.br 
§ FUCAPE Business School: bfunchal@fucape.br   2 
1. Introduction 
 
  In recent years, the development economics literature has established a causal link 
between  financial development  and economic performance  at  the macro level (King and 
Levine [1993], Levine and Zervos [1998], Levine, Loayza and Beck [2000]). Evidence also 
suggests that sound institutions explain financial deepening (Barth et al. [1983], La Porta et 
al.  [1997,  1998],  Djankov  et  al.  [2007],  Costa  and  De  Mello  [2008]).  From  a  policy 
perspective, it is crucial to understand, both theoretically and empirically, which institutions 
matter  for  financial  development.  This  paper  contributes  to  this  understanding  by 
documenting  the  importance  of  strong  collateral  in  explaining  financial  deepening.  We 
document that the use of future income as collateral caused a large surge in personal loans in 
Brazil. Our results suggest that policies that strengthen collateral have a major impact on 
lenders’ ability to underwrite, and they thus improve borrowers’ access to finance. 
  In December 2003, the Brazilian Congress passed new legislation regulating the legal 
status of payroll lending, which consists of personal loans for which the principal and interest 
payments are directly deducted from the borrower’s payroll check. In practice, payroll loans 
turn  future  income  into  collateral.  The  law  regulates  the  procedures  through  which 
commercial  banks  underwrite  payroll  loans  to  private-sector  employees
1  and  to  those 
receiving social security benefits from the Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), the 
federally run pay-as-go pension system. Among other regulations, the law mandates that the 
principal  and  interest  amount  to  no  more  than  30%  of  the  borrower's  income.  INSS 
beneficiaries constitute the largest market for payroll lending (roughly 50% in 2008), and the 
law mandates that banks need to be chartered by the INSS to lend to recipients of social 
security benefits. The chartering process started in April 2004, and banks were chartered at 
different points in time. 
Theory predicts that payroll lending will shift the supply of credit through different 
channels. The income stream of retirees and public servants is stable, so future income is a 
valuable guarantee in case of involuntary default. Lenders are left mostly with individual 
idiosyncratic risk such as death, which is largely diversifiable. In addition, the fact that the 
borrower loses part of her income in case of delinquency eliminates a significant part of the 
                                                 
1 Public sector workers had already been eligible for payroll loans since 1991.   3 
incentive for strategic default (over-borrowing is limited by law).
2 In summary, the presence 
of  strong  collateral  m itigates moral  hazard problems   and  reduces  the consequences   of 
involuntary default, thus reducing the costs of underwriting loans. Consequently, the supply 
of personal credit from chartered banks shifts outward. We call this the “direct effect” of the 
payroll  loan  law.  The  equilibrium  response  of  non-chartered  banks  is  theoretically 
ambiguous.  On  the  cost  side,  the  marginal  costs  of  non-chartered  banks  either  remain 
constant or increase, depending on the elasticity of the supply of funds for personal loans and 
on a composition effect (better borrowers now take payroll loans). On the strategy side, the 
response depends on whether the choice variable is a strategic substitute or a complement 
(i.e.,  prices  or  quantities,  see  Bulow  et.  al.  [1983]).  Despite  the  ambiguity,  we  argue  in 
Section 3 that most theoretical  models  predict  that  the “indirect  effect”  is negative  (i.e., 
unchartered  institutions  reduce  quantities  in  equilibrium).  Because  personal  loans  are  a 
homogeneous good, theory predicts that interest rates will drop across the board. In addition 
to measuring both the direct and indirect effects, we show that the aggregate impact of the 
law was to reduce interest rates and increase loan concessions, which is important for two 
reasons.
3 First, from a policy perspective, it is important to have a quantitative sense of the 
aggregate impact of the law because  unchartered institutions are likely to reduce quantities. 
Second, computing  the  industry-level  effects  serves as a falsification test   because most 
oligopoly models predict an increase in market-level quantities in equilibrium. 
  We explore two sources of variation to identify the impact of the introduction of  the 
law.  Payroll  lending  affects  personal  loans  but  not  other  credit  categories.  We  use  a 
difference-in-differences design in which car loans are the control group and personal loans 
are the treatment group. Both loans are collateralized, which is a desirable feature. However, 
personal loans are not earmarked for the purchase of a certain type of product. As we show in 
Section 5, other characteristics of personal and car loans are constant over time, thus making 
the unconfoundedness assumption credible (Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983]). We use personal 
loans  in  aggregate  rather  than  payroll  lending  for  two  reasons.  First,  we  do  not  have 
information on personal lending stratified between payroll and non-payroll loans; we only 
                                                 
2 Immediately after the law passed, legal uncertainty arose about whether courts would actually enforce the 
deductions (Costa and De Mello [2008]). By the time the first agreements for automatic deduction were 
signed between banks and the INSS, most of this risk had dissipated because of a Supreme Court decision. 
3 The industry-level impact is similar to general equilibrium effects in the treatment effect literature. See 
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and Meyer (1995).   4 
have information on personal loans in general. Second, from a policy perspective, the object 
of interest is the impact on total personal loans. The second source of variation is the fact that 
treatment  was  staggered in  nature:  banks were  chartered to underwrite  personal  loans at 
different points in time. 
  Comparing payroll loans and automobile loans, we find that, after receiving the INSS 
charter, a typical chartered bank reduced annual real interest rates by 7.7 percentage points 
(from a pre-treatment level of 72 percentage points) and increased monthly concessions by 
R$46 million, starting from a base of R$30 million (US$27 and US$18 million, respectively). 
Because they were forced by competition, unchartered banks reduced both quantities and 
interest rates. At the industry level, the law caused an increase in lending and a reduction in 
interest rates. As expected, quantities increased less at the industry level. 
  Our  findings  contribute  to  the  banking  literature.  Empirically  establishing  the 
importance  of  collateral  is  an  elusive  task  because  the  presence  of  a  guarantee  is  not 
exogenous.  Safer  borrowers  may  have  more  access  to  collateral,  and  more  problematic 
borrowers may introduce collateral to compensate for their riskier profile. As we show in 
Section 5, by comparing personal and auto loans before and after chartering, our strategy 
recovers a more credible causal effect of collateral on the terms of lending. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the new Payroll Lending Law. 
Section 3 briefly summarizes the theoretical arguments behind the direct and indirect effects. 
Section 4 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 outlines the 
empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Payroll Lending Law 
 
Payroll lending has existed in Brazil since the establishment of Law 8,112, which was 
enacted in December 1990 to regulate the provision of such loans to public-sector retirees 
and public servants. Private-sector retirees and employees were not included in the scope of 
the law.
4 In September 2003, the executive branch sent congress new legislation on payroll 
loans  (Medida  Provisória  130),  which  was  subsequently  passed  into  law  (Law  10,820, 
                                                 
4 The stability of the future income stream is crucial for payroll deduction to be reliable as a guarantee. 
However,  the  law  had  little  impact  during  the  early  1990s  because  of  macroeconomic  instability  that 
hindered the advance of financial intermediation in general.   5 
December 2003).
5 The new law regulated the use of  payroll loans, or  salary consignation 
(called “consigned credit”), for private-sector employees and private-sector social security 
beneficiaries of the INSS. 
The  borrower’s  income  constrains  the  size  of  payroll  loans.  Monthly  deductions 
cannot be larger than thirty percent of the disposable wage or benefit, and loans must have a 
fixed  payment  during  the  amortization  period.
6  Severance  earnings  can be used for the 
amortization of the remainder of the debt.
7 Employers have several obligations with respect 
to the amounts of the loans and the information that is passed on to the financial institutions 
and  employees.  For  active  private -sector  employees,  trade  unions  must  act  as  an 
intermediary. Unions normally suggest a lender, but the employee is free to choose any 
financial institution. 
In practice,  private-sector retirees are  the most important pool of borrowers. The 
reason for this is simple: the INSS is backed by the National Treasury, and the pension 
system  is  pay-as-you  go.  Thus,  the  lenders  face  sovereign  risk  plus  an  increased  but 
diversifiable risk of death. The law mandates that the INSS authorize institutions before they 
can underwrite loans to retirees. Because this process took some time, the law became fully 
effective in April 2004, when the INSS authorized  Caixa Econômica Federal (a federally 
owned S&L) to underwrite payroll loans.
8 Subsequently, Banco de Minas Gerais became the 
first authorized private bank. As of December 2005, the INSS had chartered 44 financial 
institutions. Figure 1 shows the evolution of delinquency rates (loans delinquent for more 
than 30 days over the total stock of loans) for auto and personal loans from Jan-03 through 
                                                 
5 A Medida Provisória (provisional measure) is a presidential decree, with the status of ordinary law, that 
takes  effect  immediately  but  is  then  subject  to  congressional  approval  or  amendment.  Congressional 
deliberation of provisional measures takes priority over consideration of other legislation. If Congress does 
not decide within the legal time frame, the president can reissue the measure. 
6  Disposable  wage  is  the  net  of  compulsory  deductions,  such  as  taxes,  compulsory  social  security 
contributions, and alimony support. 
7 Severance pay comprises all accrued rights of employees on dismissal without cause. The most important 
item is the money on deposit in the Severance Indemnity Guarantee Fund (F GTS in Portuguese acronym). 
Employers must pay 8% of base pay monthly into a blocked account to establish an unemployment fund 
(separate from the regular unemployment insurance entitlement, which is very small and only lasts five 
months). Upon dismissal without cause or retirement (or for certain other reasons such as buying a home), 
the employee receives the money, and the employer must pay a 40% fine on top of the deposits made 
during the entire employment period. 
8 To determine the month in which an institution became able to underwrite payroll loans, we used the 
following criterion: when the date of  signing of  the agreement was in the first half of the month , we 
considered underwriting to have begun during that same month; otherwise, we considered it to have begun 
the following month.   6 
Dec-08. Several important facts emerge from this picture. First, delinquency rates of auto and 
personal loans were following very similar trends before the chartering process began. When 
the chartering process began in Apr-04, 6.9% of auto loans were delinquent (more than 30 
days overdue). For personal loans, this figure was 9.7%. The lower delinquency rate on auto 
loans  explains  the  lower  interest  charged  relative  to  personal  loans  before  the  law  was 
enacted. The average maturity on personal loans is 10 months. Thus, the impact of the law on 
delinquency  should  take  at  least  one  year  to  manifest.  Indeed,  the  delinquency  rate  on 
personal  loans  oscillated  around  9  percentage  points  until  mid-2006,  when  it  started  to 
decline steadily. In contrast, auto loan delinquency stabilized at the 7% level after mid-2006. 
By the end of 2007, 7.5% of personal loans were delinquent, only a little more than the 
percentage  of  delinquent  auto  loans.  After  2007,  delinquency  on  auto  loans  surpassed 
delinquency on personal loans. 
In summary, the law reduced delinquency rates on personal loans, both in absolute 
terms and relative to auto loans. This change represents a reduction in the marginal cost of 
loan  underwriting  for  chartered  institutions.  Furthermore,  as  of  mid-2008,  there  was  no 
evidence that problems had arisen due to the introduction of the law. If  borrowers were 
excessively leveraged on personal loans, delinquency rates would have shot up by late 2008, 
when  banks  started  to  reduce  new  concessions.  In  fact,  delinquency  on  auto  loans,  not 
personal loans, shot up in late 2008 as the global financial crisis unfolded.  
Coincidentally or not, concessions for new payroll loans increased dramatically after 
the chartering process began, as seen in Figure 2, which suggests that payroll lending has 
been highly successful. 
      [FIGURE 1 HERE] 
      [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
3. Some Theory 
 
The law reduced the marginal cost of underwriting loans by introducing a strong 
guarantee. Because institutions were not chartered simultaneously (in fact, some institutions 
were not chartered at all during the sample period), there were two groups of institutions: 
chartered and unchartered.  Theory predicts  that  the first  impact  of this law  would be  to 
reduce  the  marginal  costs  of  underwriting  for  chartered  institutions.  For  non-chartered   7 
institutions, the marginal cost would stay constant at best. Costs could even increase because 
of a composition effect: borrowers with a constant stream of income, such as retires, public 
servants, and (to a lesser extent) unionized private-sector workers, could migrate to payroll 
lending.  Precisely  because  of  the  constancy  of  income,  these  borrowers  are  safer  than 
average. Thus non-chartered institutions could end up with a worse pool of borrowers. In 
summary, in most models of oligopolistic competition, the payroll lending law would result 
in an outward (producing more at the same prices) shift in the best response for chartered 
institutions. In contrast, the best response curves for unchartered institutions would either 
remain constant or shift inward. 
The final impact of the law would depend on the strategic interactions stemming from 
the shift in the best response curves. Because payroll loans tend to be homogenous, and 
because  margins  are  somewhat  high  in  Brazil,  it  is  more  natural  to  think  in  terms  of  a 
Cournot model (i.e., quantities are the choice variables).
9 Because quantities are  normally 
strategic substitutes, the best response curves  are negatively sloped. An exception occurs 
when the  firm is  sufficiently large. Bulow et al (1989) show that, as long as the demand  
schedule  is  negatively  sloped,   having  more  than  50%  of  market  share  is  a  necessary 
condition for a firm to behave as a strategic complement competitor. In 2005, the number of 
banks underwriting personal loans was 112, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
market concentration was 770, which implies that the symmetric-equivalent number of firms 
was 13.
10 Thus, it is unlikely that any bank could act as a strategic complement competitor.
11  
In summary, theory predicts that chartered institutions  will increase their quantities, 
unchartered institutions will reduce quantities, and interest rates  will drop for both groups 
(because personal loans are a homogeneous good). The net effect depends on how strong the 
quantity reduction by unchartered institutions is. However, because the average marginal cost 
                                                 
9 In 2005, Bradesco, the largest private bank in Brazil, had some $5.5 billion in profits, which amounted to 
a return on equity of 32%. This is twice the average return for European and American commercial banks. 
Other large private banks had similar returns. See “High Living,” The Economist, May 18
th, 2006. 
10 The symmetric-equivalent number of firms, or the effective number of firms, is defined as 10,000 times 
the inverse of the HHI. 
11 More precisely, quantities act as strategic substitutes if and only if the marginal revenue schedule is less 
negatively sloped than the demand schedule (this never happens with a linear demand schedule). Assuming 
that the marginal revenue is decreasing in quantity (a rather weak condition if diseconomies of scale are not 
too strong because, otherwise, the industry is producing too little, even for a monopolist), the firm’s 
marginal revenue curve can only be more negatively sloped than the demand curve if the firm has more 
than 50% of market share. See Bulow et al (1989, pg. 500).   8 
of  underwriting  drops  for  the  industry,  a  Cournot  model  with  different  marginal  costs 
predicts an increase in quantities at the industry level.
12 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We used an original dataset of “call reports” from the Central Bank of Brazil. The call 
reports contain monthly information about the volume of new loans, interest rates, type of 
indexation  (e.g.,  prefixed,  interest  rate  indexation,  exchange  rate  indexation  and  price 
indexation),  and  the  type  of  borrower  (household  or  firm)  for  all  Brazilian  financial 
institutions. Banks have to report data on maturity and default rates on a monthly basis. The 
data only include non-earmarked credit.
13 
We used information about two categories of con sumer finance: personal and  car 
loans.  Personal  loans  typically  involve  screening  by  financial  institutions  and  a  prior 
relationship with the bank. Borrowers must have a checking account, and  the bank normally 
deducts loan repayments whenever the outstandi ng balance allows this  on  the due date. 
Personal loans are divided into two categories:  direct consumer credit (crédito  direto  ao 
consumidor, or CDC) and payroll lending. The difference is the presence of a guarantee: 
whereas direct credit is unsecured, the borrower’s salary or social security benefit is used as 
collateral for payroll lending. Neither category of personal loan is tied to the purchase of any 
specific good, so the borrower can spend the proceeds as he or she pleases. Car loans are 
secured by the car. In both cases, we restrict our attention to pre-fixed-rate loans, the most 
common category of pricing (roughly 90%). 
  The data collected run from Jan-00 through Dec-06. We used monthly data, and the 
monthly volume of new loans was constructed by aggregating daily values. An observation 
consists of an institution/loan-category/month triplet. The monthly interest rate is obtained by 
weighting the daily rate by the daily volume of new loans underwritten by the institution. We 
obtained data on 112 financial institutions that offered personal loans and 57 that offered car 
                                                 
12 Everything else remaining constant, the law reduces the marginal cost of underwriting loans to some 
borrowers (retirees) at some institutions. At most, composition effects redistribute borrowers among 
institutions, not changing the average cost of underwriting at the industry level. 
13 Two important credit categories are earmarked. Part of the funding of Banco do Brasil (the largest public 
bank) is earmarked for agricultural working capital. Funding from savings accounts , which receive special 
treatment in the form of implicit government guarantee, is earmarked for mortgages.   9 
loans. We divided the sample into two subsamples. Our main subsample ran from Jan-03 
through Oct-05. Out of the 112 institutions in the personal loan market, 40 were chartered by 
the INSS to supply payroll loans to pensioners at some point during the sample period. The 
main sample had 34 time-series units and 169 (57+112) cross-section units, totaling 5,746 
observations. There were three reasons for the choice of the 2003-2005 sample period. The 
first reason pertains to potential biases in the estimate: a longer sample period increases the 
odds of capturing unobserved effects. This effect is particularly problematic when estimating 
the indirect effect because this effect is measured by estimating breaks in the times-series 
pattern of the data (see Section 5). We also needed data from some period of time before the 
chartering process began. Jan-03 is about one-and-a-half years before the chartering process 
began, so this choice strikes a good balance between reducing bias and having sufficient 
variation before the beginning of the chartering process.   
  Precision is another reason for the choice of the sample period. The indirect effect is 
an estimated coefficient on a year dummy. Thus, expanding the sample may increase the 
variance  of  the  estimated  indirect  effect  because  it  reduces  the  number  of  unchartered 
institutions. Again, restricting the analysis to Oct-05 struck a good balance between chartered 
and unchartered institutions in the sample. Finally, in Jul-06 the government imposed a cap 
on interest charged on personal loans, thus interfering with the market-based pricing process. 
Because we prefer data generated under normal pricing conditions, restricting the sample to 
before 2006 is a good idea.  
  Having said all that, we did extend the sample period from Jan-00 to Dec-06 to check 
whether the results were robust when the sample was modified (see Section 6.C). Beyond 
2006, we are left with too few unchartered institutions to estimate the indirect effect. 
  Lending increased in both categories, reflecting the deepening of the Brazilian credit 
market during the sample period. In the pre-treatment period (Jan-03 through Mar-04), the 
average (across institutions) monthly volume of new personal loans was R$30 million (US$ 
18 million). In the post-treatment period, the new concessions were on average R$49 million 
(US$29 million), a 63% increase. New auto loans increased from R$33 million to R$48 
million (US$19 million to US$28 million), a 45% increase. Thus, a comparison of averages 
suggests that personal lending increased more than auto lending. Mutatis mutandis, interest 
rates  were  declining  in  general,  reflecting  an  improvement  in  the  performance  of  the   10 
Brazilian credit market during the period. Again, the drop was more pronounced for personal 
loans, with annual real interest rates falling from 80 percentage points before the new law to 
55 percentage points afterwards. The real rate on auto loans fell from 27 percentage points to 
25 percentage points.
14 Thus, rates on personal loans fell significantly more than auto loan 
rates. The difference in levels reflects the fact that, despite the law, delinquency rates on auto 
loans were still lower than those on personal loans as of late 2005 (see Figure 1). 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
 
We wanted to identify the average effect  that the introduction of the law had  on 
personal credit (i.e., the average impact of treatment on the treatment group). In an ideal 
experimental setting, we would have randomly selected some financial institutions to take 
payroll collateral while others remained unsecured. Unfortunately, the chartering process was 
not random. Nevertheless, we can evaluate how random the timing of chartering was using 
observables. We followed the literature on endogenous policy evaluation and estimated a 
log-normal  duration  model  to  study  whether  the  timing  of  chartering  was  systematically 
associated with observables.
15 We ran a Tobit regression of the log number of months until 
chartering  on  the  bank’s  characteristics,  such  as  size  (log(assets)),  liquidity,  deposits, 
leverage, and ownership (foreign/national, private sector/public sector). The data are upper-
censored at the number of months until the end of the sample.
16 Table 1 shows that the time 
of chartering was not systematically related to institutional characteristics. This result is not 
definite evidence that our experiment  was as good as a randomized one because chartering 
could still be related to unobservables. 
      [TABLE 1 HERE] 
  In the absence of a controlled randomized trial, we turn ed  to non-experimental 
methods to emulate the ideal experiment. We used a difference-in-differences with fixed-
effects design, which compares the outcomes in the treatment group before and after the 
                                                 
14 Figures for both new loan concessions and interest rates were un-weighted averages across institutions. 
The purpose of these averages was to inform the regression analysis in the next Section, and they must not 
be viewed as measures of the aggregate impact of the law. See Section 6.D for the aggregate impact of the 
law. 
15 See, for example, Galiani et al (2005). 
16 For technical details on the implementation of the duration model, see Kiefer (1988).   11 
intervention  with  outcomes  in  the  control  group  while  controlling  for  time-invariant 
heterogeneity. The inclusion of time period (month) dummies accounted for all common 
shocks (pure time-series). The treatment group consisted of personal loans and the control 
group  consisted  of  auto  loans.  The  cross-section  unit  was  a  pair  consisting  of  financial 
institution  and  type  of  loan,  and  the  time-series  unit  was  a  month.  In  summary,  the 
identifying variation was the difference (at the bank level) between personal and auto loans, 
before and after adoption of the law. More specifically, we measured the direct effect of the 
law by estimating the following model: 
 
                                                                                      (1), 
 
where      is the amount underwritten or the interest rate charged in category j (personal or 
auto loans) by institution i in month t. The  right-hand side of the equation included the 
following: 1) a full set of institution/type-of-loan dummies (       ), which controlled for all 
pure cross-section-invariant unobserved heterogeneity; and 2) a full set of month dummies 
(  ) that controlled for all common shocks to the credit market, such as changes to monetary 
policy. We clustered observations at the institution/type-of-loan level, a standard procedure 
when  using  difference-in-differences  methods  (Bertrand  et  al  [2004]).  Only  chartered 
institutions were included in the sample when estimating the direct effect. 
  The  coefficient  of  interest  is  β,  the  difference-in-differences  parameter  associated 
with      , a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 for personal loans in all periods when 
institution i was chartered to underwrite payroll loans. The sample only includes banks that 
were chartered at some point during the sample period. 
  We measure the indirect effects of the law by estimating the following model: 
 
                                                                                 (2). 
 
Again,      is the amount underwritten or the interest rate charged in category j (personal or 
auto loans) by institution i in month t,         is a set of institution/type-of-loan dummies, 
and    is a full set of month dummies.             is a dummy that assumes a value of 1   12 
after  time  T.  Because  no  “treatment”  period  existed  for  unchartered  institutions,  we 
considered different “artificial” treatment dates (T = May-04, Sept-04, Jan-05 and May-05). 
In this case,    was again a dummy that assumed a value of 1 for personal loan concessions. 
We  expected  the  impact  on  unchartered  institutions  to  be  stronger  over  time  as  more 
institutions were chartered. 
  Inspection of model (2) makes it clear why we preferred the sample period from Jan-
03  through  Oct-05.  The  precision  of  the  estimate  for     (the  coefficient  associated  with 
          ) depends to a large extent on the number of cross-section observations (i.e., 
on the number of unchartered institutions). With the preferred sample, the sample is more 
balanced between chartered and unchartered institutions. 
  The  fact  that  chartering  was  not  random  posed  several  additional  challenges. 
Unobserved shocks  to  the  car  and personal  lending markets  could  drive results.  Perhaps 
creditor  protection  was  improving  throughout  the  sample  period,  and  this  improvement 
benefited uncollateralized personal loans more than car loans (which are collateralized by 
definition). Several facts suggest that time-varying unobserved loan characteristics did not 
drive the results. First, auto and personal loans are subject to similar aggregate demand and 
supply shocks, which are captured by the month dummies. Second, although it is conceivable 
that auto and personal loans are subject to different specific unobserved shocks, it is unlikely 
that different unobserved shocks would hit different banks at different times. In other words, 
the staggered nature of the chartering process is a strong source of identification. Third, from 
a demand perspective, personal and auto loans are taken out for different purposes and are 
thus very imperfect substitutes. Fourth, auto and personal loans are a small part of banks' 
balance sheets; thus, it is unlikely that they directly compete for funds at the margin. Finally, 
Figures 3 and 4 depict the series of interest rates and aggregate new personal and auto loans 
from Jan-03 through Apr-04, when the chartering process began.
17 Secular trends that were 
too dissimilar would have raised the suspicion that some unobservable characteristics drove 
the results. Visual inspection shows that the  secular trends were similar in  the treatment 
(personal loans) and control (auto loans) groups. 
                                                 
17 In contrast with the figures in the descriptive statistics Section, in Figures 3 and 4, interest rates are 
computed by weighting institutions by their relative size in the market (auto or personal). New loan 
concessions are aggregated at the market level. Auto loans are lower than personal loans because fewer 
institutions underwrite auto loans.   13 
        [FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE]      
  We  also  tested  the equality of pre-treatment  secular  trends  following a procedure 
proposed by Banerjee et al (2002). We ran separate regressions for auto and new personal 
loans and interest rates over the period of Jan-03 to Mar-04 (pre-treatment). We included 
institution and month dummies. We had three samples: chartered banks (for the direct effect), 
non-chartered banks (for the indirect effect). The equality of pre-treatment secular trends 
would be rejected if the coefficient was significantly different from zero. Table 2 shows that 
we cannot reject the zero-null hypothesis in any case. 




6.A Direct Effects 
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation (1) for both dependent variables: 
new loan originations (R$ million per month) and interest rate (percentage points per year). 
The law caused chartered institutions to increase personal loans by R$46 million more than 
auto loans (column 1). Interest rates on personal loans fell by 7.70 percentage points more 
than rates for auto loans (column 2). Both effects are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
In summary, the law led to a shift in the supply of personal loans for chartered institutions. 
        [TABLE 3 HERE]       
 
6.B Indirect Effects 
 
  Table 4 presents the estimates for equation (2) with interest rates (percentage points 
annually) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 4 report results for different pre- and post-
treatment periods. The law also caused a reduction of roughly 5 percentage points in annual 
interest  rates  charged  by  non-chartered  institutions.  All  of  the  results  are  statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
        [TABLE 4 HERE]         14 
  Table 5 shows the same results for new loans. The precision of the estimates is low, 
with  p-values  ranging  from  18%  to  11%;  thus,  one  should  keep  in  mind  the  caveats  in 
interpreting  imprecise  estimates.  Nevertheless,  the  indirect  effect  suggests  that  the 
introduction of payroll loans caused a reduction in new lending by non-chartered institutions. 
An additional indication that  the estimates  capture something meaningful  is the negative 
impact on unchartered institution quantities, which increased over time (from -R$15 million 
(US$9  million)  to  -R$20  million  (US$12  million)  per  institution  monthly)  as  more 
competitors were chartered, precisely as one would expect.  
        [TABLE 5 HERE]   
  The  estimated  indirect  effect  is  precisely  the  expected  strategic  reaction  of  an 
oligopolist facing a competitor whose marginal costs have decreased. Because personal loans 
are  homogeneous  goods,  unchartered  institutions  have  no  alternative  but  to  reduce  their 
prices. The impact on interest rates is immediate and roughly constant over time. The impact 
on quantities becomes stronger over time as more competitors are chartered. Assuming that 
market-level marginal revenue decreases with quantity, the optimal reaction of a firm with 
constant (or increasing) marginal costs is to reduce quantities. 
  
6.C Robustness Analysis: 2000 – 2006 sample 
 
  We expanded the sample to probe the robustness of the results. We emphasize that 
the  results  are  much  more  informative  about  the  direct  effect,  due  to  both  for  bias  and 
variance. Table 6 shows the results for the direct effect, which are very similar to those in 
Table 3. 
        [TABLE 6 HERE] 
  Tables 7 and 8 show the estimates for the indirect effect. Point estimates for the 
impact  on  interest  rates  and  new  concessions  confirmed  our  expectations:  unchartered 
institutions reduced both their interest rates and quantities. The magnitude of the impact on 
interest rates was somewhat reduced but was still in line with the result calculated using the 
2003-2005  sample,  roughly  three  percentage  points  versus  five  percentage  points.  In 
accordance with our expectations and the results in Tables 4 and 5, the indirect effect became 
stronger over time as more institutions were chartered. Precision was lower, as expected,   15 
with p-values ranging from 0.25 to 0.08. Point estimates for quantities are larger than those 
obtained with the 2003-2005 sample because institutions chartered in 2006 were relatively 
small  and  the  regression  treats  all  observations  equally.  Again,  the  indirect  effect  on 
quantities increased over time. 
  In  summary,  the  results  obtained  with  the  preferred  2003-2005  sample  are  not 
particular to that sample: when we expanded the analysis to 2000-2006, we obtained similar 
figures. The precision of the direct effect estimates was similar, as expected. Precision was 
reduced when estimating the indirect effect, which was also expected. 
      [TABLES 7 AND 8 HERE] 
 
6.D Industry-level Impact of the Law 
 
  Chartered institutions expanded quantities (direct effect) and unchartered institutions 
restricted quantities (indirect effect). In principle, the net effect is ambiguous, but the fact 
that  in  both  cases  institutions  reduced  interest  rates  strongly  suggests  that  net  quantities 
increased. 
  When  measuring  the  direct  and  indirect  effects,  we  were  interested  in  individual 
behavior.  Thus,  the  unit  of  analysis  was  an  institution,  and  all  institutions  were  treated 
equally. The industry-level effect is an aggregate object. We still could have conducted the 
analysis at the institution level and applied weights to each institution according to its relative 
importance in the personal and auto loan markets. It is, however, more straightforward to 
aggregate across institutions, which naturally yields an industry-level object for quantities. 
To compute market-level average interest rates, we used the rates charged by institutions, 
weighted according to the total amount of auto or personal loans underwritten.
18  
  Figure 5 depicts the aggregate difference in new concession s of auto and personal 
loans before and after the beginning of  the chartering process. Figure 6  shows the same 
results for the industry-level interest rate. 
      [FIGURES 5 AND 6 HERE] 
                                                 
18 The numbers on new loan concession presented in Section 5 are un-weighted averages across institutions 
and serve to inform the regression analysis. They are not measures of the aggregate impact of the law.   16 
  Both Figures 5 and 6 show a marked shift near the time of the law’s implementation. 
Comparing the period before and after the chartering process began, monthly aggregate new 
concessions of personal loans increased by R$1.1 billion (US$0.6 billion) more than auto 
loans. The annual interest rates on personal loans dropped by 12 percentage points more than 
the rates on auto loans. Interest rates dropped markedly after the chartering process began, 
and then dropped again in mid-2005. New concessions increased at two distinct time points. 
This result is expected because, over time, more and more institutions were chartered, thus 
accentuating the aggregate impact of the law. The statistical significance of the aggregate 
impact  is  measured  by  regressing  the  differences  in  concessions  and  interest  rates  on  a 
dummy representing the implementation of the law. Table 9 shows the results. 
        [TABLE 9 HERE] 
  The differences in the means in Figures 4 and 5 are significantly different from zero 
at the 1% significance level (columns 1 and 4). The figures suggest otherwise, but trends may 
be  driving  the  results.  Introducing  linear  and  quadratic  trends  does  reduce  the  mean 
differences before and after implementation of the law, but the differences are still significant 
both statistically and in practice (columns 2, 3, 5 and 6). The figures in Table 9 are not 
directly comparable to the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 because regression models (1) and (2) 
treated all institutions equally. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the magnitudes are 
similar. In column 6, interest rates dropped some 5.59 percentage points, which is between 
the 7.7 and 5 percentage points in Table 3 (direct effect) and Table 4 (indirect effect). New 
loan concessions in column 3 increased by R$460 million. The magnitude of the direct effect 
in Table 3 is R$46 million, and the magnitude of the indirect effect is - R$18 million on 
average in Table 4. There were 40 chartered and 72 unchartered institutions as of late 2005, 
respectively.  Thus,  the  magnitude  of  the  aggregate  impact  would  be                
              million. 
   
8. Conclusion 
 
  The introduction of payroll lending produced a large shift in the supply of personal 
loans  in  Brazil.  Chartered  institutions  enjoyed  a  reduction  in  the  marginal  cost  of 
underwriting  personal  loans.  Much  like  Cournot  competitors,  non-chartered  institutions   17 
contracted their supply. The industry-level result is a net increase in loans and a drop in 
interest rates.  
  It is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of our results. Payroll lending is a 
novel  collateralization  instrument  that  has  relatively  low  recovery  costs  because  the 
guarantee is money, which is obviously the most liquid asset. Brazil is a country that scores 
low on creditor protection measures. In this context, a simple, credible collateral instrument 
is particularly valuable. The aggregate impact is strongly positive. Thus, in terms of policy, 
the instrument is relevant. Concerning external validity, many other countries share credit 
market characteristics similar to those of Brazil. Thus, it is not far-fetched to speculate that 
payroll  lending  will  be  a  valuable  instrument  for  financial  deepening  in  weak  creditor 
protection environments. 
  Our results do not provide insight into the longer-term effects of financial deepening 
based on consumer lending. These funds may be used to smooth out consumption expenses 
or to finance small businesses, which is an interesting avenue for future research. Evidence 
suggests  that  payroll  lending  is  one  of  the  major  drivers  in  creating  a  strong  internal 
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Fig. 1 Delinquency Rates : Auto versus Personal Loans
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Fig. 3 Monthly New Loan Concessions
Source: Banco Central do Brasil. †: Total personal lending includes both payroll 
and non-payroll personal loans. 
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Source: Banco Central do Brasil
Personal Loans - Auto Loans
Fig. 6 Difference in Yearly Interest Rates



















Number of observations 112 112
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates from 
a Tobit regression of time until INSS chartering. Upper censoring in December 2005. Liquidity = cash-in-hand+Treasury 
Bonds+Interbank)/assets. Leverage = Debt/Assets






Dummy=1 if the bank is foreign 
Dummy=1 if the bank is private and domestic 
Dummy = 1 if the bank is universal 
Dummy=1 if the bank is part of a financial conglomerate  





Table 2 Difference Control Test (OLS Estimates)
Interest 
rates (%)




New loans (R$ 
million)
p-value 0.95 0.14 0.73 0.55)
Number of observations 1184 1363 1515 1680
R
2







Number of observations 1793 1627
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors robust to clustering at the institution/type of loan level in parentheses
Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Models for the direct effect
New Loans  (R$ millions, 
monthly)
Interest Rate (percentage 
points, annual)
Personal Loans (=1)
Source: Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and Banco Central do Brasil
All specifications include a fixed-effects (institution/type of loan dummies), and year dummies.
Interest Rate (percentage points, annual)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-5.03 -4.91 -5.28 -5.03
(2.18)** (2.42)** (2.55)** (2.18)**
Threshold Point May-04 Sep-04 Jan-05 May-05
R
2 16% 16% 16% 16%
Number of obs 3313 3313 3313 3313
Source: Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and Banco Central do Brasil
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors robust to clustering at the institution/type of loan level in parentheses
Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Models for the indirect effect
All specifications include a fixed-effects (institution/type of loan dummies), and year dummies.




New Loans (R$ millions, monthly)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-15 -17 -17 -20
(11) (12) (13) (13)
Threshold Point May-04 Sep-04 Jan-05 May-05
R
2 0.104 0.106 0.104 0.103
Number of obs 3625 3625 3625 3625
Source: Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and Banco Central do Brasil
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors robust to clustering at the institution/type of loan level in parentheses
All specifications include a fixed-effects (institution/type of loan dummies), and year-type of loan dummies.
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Models for the indirect effect
Personal Loans (=1)
New Loans  Interest Rate






Number of observations 4740 4452
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All specifications include a fixed-effects (institution/type of loan dummies), and year dummies.
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Models for the direct effect, 2000-2006
Source: Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and Banco Central do Brasil
Standard errors robust to clustering at the institution/type of loan level in parentheses
Personal Loans (=1)
Interest Rate (annual, percentage points)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-2.10 -2.67 -3.41 -3.54 -3.91
(2.10) (2.18) (2.18) (2.18) (2.18)*
Threshold Point May-04 Sep-04 Jan-05 May-05 May-06
R
2 14% 14% 14% 14% 14%
Number of obs 6672 6672 6672 6672 6672
Source: Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and Banco Central do Brasil
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors robust to clustering at the institution/type of loan level in parentheses
Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Models for the indirect effect, 2000-2006
Personal Loans (=1)
All specifications include a fixed-effects (institution/type of loan dummies), and year-type of loan   25 
 
 
Table 8: Difference-in-Differences Models for the indirect effect, 2000-2006
New Loans (R$ millions, monthly)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-34 -36 -37 -39 -39
(23) (24) (24) (24) (23)*
Threshold Point May-04 Sep-04 Jan-05 May-05 May-06
R
2 0.127 0.128 0.128 0.127 0.12
Number of obs 7146 7146 7146 7146 7146
Source: Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and Banco Central do Brasil
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors robust to clustering at the institution/type of loan level in parentheses
All specifications include a fixed-effects (institution/type of loan dummies), and year dummies.
Personal Loans (=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.14 0.44 0.46 -11.92 -6.21 -5.59
(0.20)*** (0.20)** (0.19)** (1.65)*** (2.03)*** (1.68)***
0.04 -0.19 -0.33 -7.96




2 68% 77% 77% 80% 86% 87%
Number of obs 34 34 34 34 34 34
Source: Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and Banco Central do Brasil
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standard errors robust to second-order auto-correlation in the error term.
b  =  1 if the chartering process has begun (after April-04)
c  = time is a trend, i.e, time = 1, 2,…
a  =  Personal minus Auto Loans. Interest rates are averages weighted according to the amount of 
concessions underwrittern  by institutions.
Time Squared
Table 9: Industry-Level Impact (Newey-West Regressions)
ΔConcessions (R$ billion, 
monthly)
a
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